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NEW DEVELOPMENTS IN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE
Paul C. Giannelli
Albert J. Weatherhead Ill & Richard W. Weatherhead
Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve University
Justice Breyer, in an address to the American
Association for the Advancement of Science, noted the pervasive use of expert witnesses in modern litigation: "My
own Court's docket is illustrative, for scientific issues permeate the law. Criminal courts consider the scientific validity
of, say, DNA sampling, ... voice prints, or expert predictions
of defendants' 'future dangerousness' which can lead courts
or juries to authorize or withhold the death penalty." As the
Justice's remarks suggest, the U.S. Supreme Court is playing a prominent role in shaping the law governing the introduction of scientific testimony.
This article discusses this development, especially in
light of the Court's latest decision, Kumho Tire Co. v.
Carmichael, 119 S.Ct. 1167 (1999), and its impact on criminal trials under Ohio Evidence Rule 702. Even before
Kumho Tire, many coL•rts began a reevaluation of a number
of types of scientific evidence, such as hair comparisons,
firearms identification, questioned document examinations,
and polygraph results. In addition, a number of courts have
confronted the admissibility of evidence based on social science research- e.g., repressed memories and false confessions.
THE DAUBERTSTANDARD
In 1993, the U.S. Supreme Court in Daubert v. Merrell
Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993), adopted a
reliability test for determining the admissibility of scientific
evidence and overruled the traditional general acceptance
standard set forth in Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013
(D.C. Cir. 1923). The Frye standard had been the majority
rule in both federal and state courts until Daubert. See
Giannelli, The Admissibility of Novel Scientific Evidence:
Frye v. United States, A Half-Century Later, 80 Colum. L.
Rev. 1197 (1980).
The Supreme Court's decision rested on an interpretation
of Federal Rule of Evidence 702, the principal provision
governing the admissibility of expert testimony. The rule
provides: "If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence
or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education,

may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise."
The Daubert Court wrote: "[l]n order to qualify as 'scientific
knowledge,' an inference or assertion must be derived by
the scientific method. Proposed testimC?nY must be supported by appropriate validation-i.e., 'good grounds,' based on
what is known. In short, the requirement that an expert's
testimony pertain to 'scientific knowledge' establishes a
standard of evidentiary reliability." ld. at 590.
Reliability Factors
In describing the trial judge's screening or "gatekeeping
function," the Daubert Court identified a number of factors.
First, in evaluating reliability, a judge should determine
whether the scientific theory or technique can be and has
been tested. Citing scientific authorities, the Court recognized that a hallmark of science is empirical testing.
Second, whether a theory or technique has been subjected
to peer review and publication is "a relevant, though not dispositive, consideration in assessing ... scientific validity." ld.
at 594. The peer review and publication process increases
the likelihood that flaws in methodology will be detected.
Third, a technique's "known or potential rate of error" is a
pertinent factor. Fourth, the "existence and maintenance of
standards controlling the technique's operation" are other
indicia of trustworthiness. Finally, "general acceptance" remains an important consideration. Although the Court rejected "general acceptance" as the sole criterion for admissibility, it recognized its relevance in assessing the reliability
of scientific evidence-at least, circumstantially. These enumerated factors, however, are neither dispositive nor exhaustive. The Daubert Court cautioned: "Many factors will
bear on the inquiry, and we do not presume to set out a definitive checklist or test." Id. at 593. Indeed, the Court emphasized that the standard is "a flexible one." ld. at 594.
In a footnote, the Supreme Court noted that several authorities had proposed additional factors for assessing reliability. ld. at 595 n.12. The Court cited Judge Weinstein and
Professor Berger's treatise; those authors listed the following factors: (1) the technique's gerieral acceptance in the
field, (2) the expert's qualifications and stature, (3) the use
to which the new technique has been applied, (4) the potential rate of error, (5) the existence of specialized literature,
(6) the novelty of the new invention, and (7) the extent to
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which the technique relies on the subjective interpretation of
the expert. 3 J. Weinstein & M. Berger, Weinstein's
Evidence 702[03], at 702-41 to -42 (1988). Finally, the
Court cited Justice Mark McCormick's article, which had
specified eleven factors. McCormick, Scientific Evidence:
Defining a New Approach to Admissibility, 67 Iowa L. Rev.
879, 911-12. (1982)(including the presence of safeguards in
the characteristics of the technique, analogy to other scientific techniques whose results are admissible, the nature
and breadth of the inference adduced, the clarity and simplicity with which the technique can be described and its results explained, the extent to which the basic data are verifiable by the court and the jury, and the availability of other
experts to test and evaluate the technique). In sum, the
Court made it clear that the Daubert factors were never intended as an exhaustive, mechanical "checklist"-even with
respect to "scientific" evidence.

general acceptance nor peer review are "prerequisites to
admissibility under Daubert." The Court stated:
[A] trial court's role in determining whether an expert's
testimony is admissible under Evid.R. 702(C) focuses on
whether the opinion is based upon scientifically valid
principles, not whether the expert's conclusions are correct or whether the testimony satisfies the proponent's
burden of proof at trial. ...
Furthermore, the reliability requirement of Daubert
should not be used to exclude all evidence of questionable reliability, nor should a court exclude such evidence
simply because the evidence is confusing. . . . Instead,
there must be something that makes the scientific technique particularly overwhelming to laypersons for the
court to exclude such evidence. . . . Thus, the "ultimate
touchstone is helpfulness to the trier of fact, and with regard to reliability, helpfulness turns on whether the expert's 'technique or principle [is] sufficiently reliable so
that it will aid the jury in reaching accurate results."' ld. at
613-14 (citations omitted).
The Court commented again on this issue in State v.
Nemeth, 82 Ohio St.3d 202, 211, 694 N.E.2d 1332 (1 998).
In Miller, the court designated the following four factors to be considered in evaluating the reliability of scientific evidence: (1) whether the theory or technique has
been tested, (2) whether it has been subjected to peer
review, (3) whether there is a known or potential rate of
error, and (4) whether the methodology has gained general acceptance.
These factors were adopted from Daubert . ...
Both the United States Supreme Court in Daubert and
this court in Miller were careful to emphasize that none of
these factors is a determinative prerequisite to admissibility.
Relevant evidence based on valid principles will
satisfy the threshold reliability standard for the admission
of expert testimony. The credibility to be afforded these
principles and the expert's conclusions remain a matter
for the trier of fact. The reliability requirement in Evid.R.
702 is a threshold determination that should focus on a
particular type of scientific evidence, not the truth or falsity of an alleged scientific fact or truth.
In State v. Stowers, 81 Ohio St.3d 260, 261, 690 N.E.2d
881 (1998), the Ohio Supreme Court noted that the requirements of Rule 702(C)(1 ), (2), and (3) do not apply when expert testimony "did not involve scientific or technical testing
or procedures."

OHIO RULE 702
The Ohio Supreme Court anticipated the U.S. Supreme
Court's decision in Daubert by a decade. The Court had
cited the Frye general acceptance test in several pre-Rules
cases. E.g., State v. Thomas, 66 Ohio St.2d 518, 423
N.E.2d 137 (1981); Trebotich v. Broglio, 33 Ohio St.2d 57,
59-60, 294 N .E.2d 669 (1 973); State v. Holt, 17 Ohio St.2d
81, 85, 246 N.E.2d 365 (1969). However, in State v.
Williams, 4 Ohio St.3d 53, 58, 446 N.E.2d 444 (1983)(voiceprints), the Ohio Supreme Court rejected the Frye test, holding that the admissibility of novel scientific evidence should
be governed by Rule 702 and Rule 403. According to the
Court, "the Rules of Evidence establish adequate preconditions for admissibility of expert testimony, and we leave to
the discretion of this state's judiciary, on a case by case
basis, to decide whether the questioned testimony is relevant and will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue." In State v. Pierce, 64
Ohio St.3d 490, 597 N.E.2d107 (1992), the Court affirmed
its prior position rejecting the Frye test, while upholding the
admissibility of DNA evidence.
In 1994, Rule 702 was amended. Rule 702(C)(1) offers
alternative ways to establish the validity of a scientific theory; the theory may either be "objectively verifiable" or "widely
accepted." The "objectively verifiable" language codifies the
approach adopted by the Ohio Supreme Court in Williams
and Pierce, as well as the U.S. Supreme Court's approach
in Daubert. The phrase "widely accepted" was taken from
an executive order issued by President Bush. Civil Justice
Reform, Exec. Order No. 12,778,56 Fed. Reg. 55,195
(1991 ). Under this order, a theory is considered "widely accepted" if it is accepted by at least a substantial minority of
experts in the relevant field.
The Ohio Supreme Court has since cited Daubert on
several occasions. In Wagner v. Roche Laboratories, 77
Ohio St.3d 116, 124, 671 N.E.2d 252 (1996) (effects of acne
drug, Accutane), the Court rejected a party's contention that
Daubert "requires a finding that appellant did not create a
jury question because the opinions elicited during testimony
of appellant's experts were not scientifically valid. Our review of the record of this case in its entirety convinces us
that appellant's experts' opinions were sufficiently grounded
in credible reasoning and scientific methodology to validly
support appellant's theory of recovery."
In Miller v. Bike Athletic Co., 80 Ohio St. 3d 607, 613, 687
N.E.2d 735 (1 998), the Supreme Court noted that neither

NON-SCIENTIFIC EXPERT TESTIMONY
In interpreting Rule 702, the Court in Daubert dealt only
with "scientific" knowledge. The plaintiffs had expressly
proffered their epidemiological testimony as scientific evidence. Rule 702, however, also refers in the alternative to
''technical" and "specialized" knowledge. That alternate
phrasing raised two issues: (1) whether Dauberfs reliability
requirement extends to these other types of expert testimony, and (2) if so, whether the factors set forth in Daubert for
assessing reliability apply in this context.
The U.S. Supreme Court in Kumho Tire Co. v.
Carmichael, 119 S.Ct. 1167 (1999), answered both questions in the affirmative. Kumho Tire involved a civil case-a
tire blow-out accident, in which the Court upheld the trial
court's decision to exclude engineering testimony concern-
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ing the cause of the blowout. However, the decision applies
to criminal cases as well.
Prior to Kumho Tire, most courts had held that some type
of reliability standard applied to "technical" evidence, but
they often differed on how reliability should be determined.
Kumho Tire resolved this split of authority, at least in federal
practice. The Supreme Court announced: "[A] trial court
may consider one or more of the specific factors that
Daubert mentioned when doing so will help determine that
testimony's reliability. But, as the Court stated in Daubert,
the test of reliability is 'flexible,' and Dauberfs list of specific
factors neither necessarily nor exclusively applies to all experts or in every case." 119 S.Ct. at 1171. The Court
added:
[W]e can neither rule out, nor rule in, for all cases and for
all time the applicability of the factors mentioned in
Daubert, nor can we now do so for subsets of cases categorized by category or expert or by kind of evidence ....
Daubert itself is not to the contrary. It made clear
that its list of factors was meant to be helpful, not definitive. Indeed, those factors do not all necessarily apply
even in every instance in which the reliability of scientific
testimony is challenged. It might not be surprising in a
particular case, for example, that a claim made by a scientific witness has never been the subject of peer review,
for the particular application at issue may never previously have interested any scientist. Nor, on the other hand,
does the presence of Dauberfs general acceptance factor help show that an expert's testimony is reliable where
the discipline itself lacks reliability, as, for example, do
theories grounded in any so-called generally accepted
principles of astrology or necromancy. ld. at 1175.
Procedural Issues
The Supreme Court also addressed related procedural
issues. The Court had previously ruled that a trial court's
decision concerning the Daubert reliability requirement was
subject to appellate review only for an abuse of discretion.
See General-Electric Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 138-39
(1 997). In Kumho Tire, the Court ruled that appellate courts
must accord trial judges discretion in other respects. There
are two aspects to this ruling. First, substantively, ''whether
Daubert's specific factors are, or are not, reasonable measures of reliability in a particular case is a matter that the
law grants the trial judge broad latitude to determine." ld. at
1176. Second, the judge enjoys discretion concerning the
procedural aspects of this inquiry. The trial court is not required to hold a "Daubert hearing" every time expert testimony is challenged. See Berger, Procedural Paradigms for
Applying the DaubertTest, 78 Minn. L. Rev. 1345 (1994).
Proposed Federal Rule
A proposed 1998 amendment to Rule 702 adds the following clause: "provided that (1) the testimony is sufficiently
based upon reliable facts or data, (2) the testimony is the
product of reliable principles and methods, and (3) the witness has applied the principles and methods reliably to the
facts of the case." 181 F.R.D. 144 (1999). The advisory
committee note states that the "amendment does not distinguish between scientific and other forms of expert testimony. The trial court's gatekeeping function applies to testimony by any expert." ld. at 149. This proposal with a few modifications, and an advisory committee note redrafted in light
of Kumho Tire, was submitted to the Supreme Court by the
Judicial Conference. If the Court accepts the proposal, it
will become effective on December 1, 2000 - unless

Congress intervenes.
HAIR COMPARISONS

I) significant post-Dauber! attack on a well-accepted
technique was launched in Williamson v. Reynolds, 904 F.
Supp. 1529, 1552 (E. D. Okl. 1995), a federal habeas corpus case. In this case an expert testified that hair samples
were "microscopically consistent." However, the "expert did
not explain which of the 'approximately' 25 characteristics
were consistent, any standards for determining whether the
samples were consistent, how many persons could be expected to share this same combination of characteristics, or
how he arrived at his conclusions." ld. at 1554. Moreover,
the district court professed that it had "been unsuccessful in
its attempts to locate any indication that expert hair comparison testimony meets any of the requirements of Daubert."
Id. at 1558. The court observed: "Although the hair expert
may have followed procedures acc;epted in the community
of hair experts, the human hair comparison results in this
case were, nonetheless, scientifically unreliable." ld. at
1558. Finally, the prosecutor exacerbated the problem by
stating in closing argument, "[T]here's a match." ld. at 1557.
Even the state court misinterpreted the evidence, writing
that the "hair evidence placed [petitioner] at the decedent's
apartment." ld. The district court decision was subsequently
reversed on other grounds. Williamson v. Ward, 110 F.3d
1508, 1523 (1Oth Cir. 1997) (due process, not Daubert,
standard applies in habeas proceedings). Significantly,
however, the defendant was later exonerated by exculpatory DNA evidence.
Williamson is not an isolated case, as demonstrated by a
1996 Department of Justice report discussing the exoneration of 28 convicts through the use of DNA technologysome of whom had been sentenced to death. Connors et
al., Convicted by Juries, Exonerated by Science: Case
Studies in the Use of DNA Evidence to Establish Innocence
After Trial 58 (1996). In several of these prosecutions, hair
analysis was used to obtain the conviction. In one case, the
expert testified that the crime scene hair sample "was unlikely to match anyone" other than the defendant, Edward
Honaker. DNA proved otherwise. See generally 2 Giannelli
& lmwinkelried, Scientific Evidence § 24-2 (3d ed. 1999)
(hair analysis).
FIREARMS IDENTIFICATIONS
Another traditional technique now coming under fire is
firearms identification ("ballistics"). Such evidence has been
accepted as a matter of course by courts since the 1930s.
However, in People v. Hawkins, 42 Cal. Rptr. 2d 636 (Cal.
1995), cert. denied, 116 S.Ct. 1685 (1 996), the defendant
attacked the scientific basis of firearms identification evidence. The prosecution experts "conceded that ballistics
identification is not an exact science. Rather, ballistics experts develop proficiency by microscopically observing a
large number of bullets known to have been fired from the
same gun, and from different guns, so that they acquire
knowledge of when the similarities of the bullets' striations
are sufficient to establish that the bullets were discharged
from the same firearm." ld. at 650.
In rebuttal in Hawkins, the defense introduced two articles by Alfred Biasotti that call tor the reform of firearms
identifications by developing a statistical data base. One
expert "conceded that ballistics identification was to some
extent more of a skill than a science, an intuition informed
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by extensive experience." ld. Although the Hawkins court
upheld admissibility under Frye, this marks one of the first
attacks on firearms identification evidence in half a century,
and the opinion was rendered before Kumho was handed
down. Kumho will likely encourage the defense to contiAue
to the attack on firearms identification testimony. See generally 1 Giannelli & lmwinkelried, Scientific Evidence ch. 14
(3d ed. 1999)(firearms & toolmarks).

certification program, professional journals and other trappings of science, cannot, after Daubert, be regarded as 'scientific ... knowledge."' United States v. Starzecpyzel, 880 F.
Supp. 1027, 1038 (S.D.N.Y. 1995). The court further stated
that "while scientific principles may relate to aspects of
handwriting analysis, they have little or nothing to do with
the day-to-day tasks performed by [Forensic Document
Examiners] .... [T]his attenuated relationship does not transform the FDE into a scientist." ld. at 1041. Nevertheless,
the court did not exclude handwriting comparison testimony.
Instead, the court pointed out that Rule 702 also permits expert testimony based on "technical" or "other specialized
knowledge." In the court's view, while Daubert did not apply
to nonscientific experts falling within these categories, Rule
702's requirement that expert testimony assist the trier of
fact mandated its own reliability analysis.
The court proceeded to find the testimony sufficiently reliable as technical evidence but placed conditions on its admissibility. Because FOE's use terms such as "laboratory"
and refer to authorities with titles containing the words "science" or "scientific," there is a risk that jurors may bestow
upon FOE's the aura of the infallibility of science.
Consequently, these terms should not be used in the testimony, and the jury ought to receive a cautionary instruction
that the testimony is based on experience, not science.
Moreover, use of a nine-level scale of probability to express
an opinion regarding genuineness appeared, in the court's
view, to be misleadingly precise. "Such [overly fine] distinctions are certainly improper in forensic document examination, where it is conceded that conclusions are drawn, in
large part, on subjective criteria." Id. at 1048. Starzecpyzel
sent shockwaves through the FDE field.
The issue surfaced again in the Oklahoma bombing
case. In United States v. McVeigh, 11 BNA Criminal
Practice Manual88 (No. 5, Feb. 26, 1997), Judge Matsch
expressed serious reservations about questioned document
examination testimony: "I don't think there is any such scientific knowledge. And that's why I don't think that ... these
people can express such opinions." Rudolf & Widenhouse,
Daubert Redux: Oklahoma City Bomb Case, 21 Champion
24, 25-26 (May 1997). The judge added:
There are no agreed standards for the terminology.
There is no confidence level that's been agreed upon ....
We do not have any body of scientific knowledge of
which I am aware that says that there are such identifying characteristics every time a person puts pencil or pen
to paper that you can say that's who it is .... And they do
it by experience. There is no academy of training for
these people. They just say, I've done enough of that
that now, I'm a self-declared expert at it.
See also United States v. Rosario, 118 F.3d 160, 168 (3d
Cir. 1997)(dissent)("Handwriting analysis is at best an inexact science, and at worst mere speculation itself .... As
such, I do not believe that wholly ambiguous testimony from
a handwriting 'expert' ... can satisfy the government's burden of proof.").
This litigation has had the salutary effect of encouraging
new research in this area, principally by Professor Moshe
Kam of Drexel University. To date, Kam has published
three studies on questioned documents. This research will
become ammunition in the battle under Kumho. See Kam et
al., Proficiency of Professional Document Examiners in
Writer Identification, 39 J. Forensic Sci. 5, 6 (1994 )("In our
tests, the professional document examiners performed sig-

BITEMARK COMPARISONS
Until recently, expert testimony concerning bitemark comparisons had been routinely admitted into evidence, even to
the extent of enjoying judicial notice. Nevertheless, a recent
case questioned the judicial acceptance of such testimony.
In Howard v. State, 697 So. 2d 415 (Miss. 1997), Dr.
Michael West purportedly made a "positive match" between
a bitemark on the victim and the defendant's teeth. "Dr.
West testified that the science of dentistry recognized that
teeth are unique, and that bite marks can 'be identified back
to the perpetrator or biter.' Dr. West also stated that bitemark evidence is similar to fingerprint identification." ld. at
428. The Mississippi Supreme Court reversed, apparently
unimpressed. The court noted:
While few courts have refused to allow some form of
bite-mark comparison evidence, numerous scholarly authorities have criticized the reliability of this method of
identifying a suspect ... . There is little consensus in the
scientific community on the number of points which must
match before any positive identification can be announced. . . . Suffice it to say that testimony concerning
bite marks in soft, living flesh has not been scientifically
accredited at this time. ld. at 429.
See generally 1 Giannelli & lmwinkelried, Scientific
Evidence ch.13 (3d ed. 1999).
HANDWRITING COMPARISONS
The challenge to handwriting comparison testimony is
perhaps the most prominent example of Daubert's influence
in criminal cases. This challenge can be traced to a seminal 1989 article written by Professors Risinger, Denbeaux
and Saks, and entitled, Exorcism of Ignorance as a Proxy
for Rational Knowledge: The Lessons of Handwriting ·
Identification "Expertise," 137 U. Pa. L. Rev. 731 (1989).
The article directly attacked the conventional wisdom, presenting a devastating critique of handwriting analysis and
arguing that the reliability of such comparisons lacks validation: "Our literature search for empirical evaluation.of handwriting identification turned up one primitive and flawed validity study from nearly 50 years ago, one 1973 paper that
raises the issue of consistency among examiners but that
presents only uncontrolled impressionistic and anecdotal information not qualifying as data in any rigorous sense, and
a summary of one study in a 1978 government report.
Beyond this, nothing." ld. at 738 (citations omitted). Not
only was validation lacking; worse still, there were indications of a troubling error rate in handwriting analysis.
According to the authors, a review of five handwriting comparison proficiency tests showed that at best "[d]ocument
examiners were correct 57% of the time and incorrect 43%
of the time." ld. at 748.
This article had little impact until Daubert was decided.
However, in 1995 a federal district court concluded that "the
testimony at the Daubert hearing firmly established that
forensic document examination, despite the existence of a
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nificantly better than members of the control group .... ");
Kam et al., Writer Identification by Professional Document
Examiners, 42 J. Forensic Sci. 778 (1997)( "The results of
our test lay to rest the debate over whether or not professional document examiners possess writer-identification
skills absent in the general population. They do."); Kam et
al., Effects of Monetary Incentives on Performance of
Nonprofessionals in Document-Examination Proficiency
Tests, 43 J. Forensic Sci. 1000 (1998).
The Eleventh Circuit addressed the admissibility issue in
United States v. Paul, 175 F.3d 906,911 (11th Cir. 1999),
which was decided after KumhO had been handed down.
The court found that the prosecution expert was qualified
and that his testimony assisted the trier of fact. The court
concluded "that the ability of the jury to perform the same visual comparisons as the expert 'cuis against the danger of
undue prejudice from the mystique attached to "experts."' ....
[The expert] specifically identified points of comparison that
he recognized between the writing of the extortion note and
the handwriting examples that Paul provided. The jury was
free to conduct its own comparison and reach its own conclusion regarding the author of the extortion note."
Moreover, the expert "acknowledged on cross-examination
that no licensing board existed for questioned documents
examiners, and the profession is not subject to standards
that quantify or measure the work of individual examiners.
Given [the expert's] admissions, the jury would not have
been confused whether handwriting analysis is scientific or
is unassailable."
Paul is in accord with the Sixth Circuit's earlier decision in
United States v. Jones, 107 F.3d 1147, 1160 (6th Cir. 1997),
in which that court wrote: "[The defendant] is, therefore,
asking us to do what no other court that we have found has
done-hold that expert handwriting analysis is inadmissible
under the Federal Rules of Evidence." ld. at 1159. The
Jones court upheld the admissibility of the evidence. Of
particular interest is the stress Jones placed on the qualifications issue, specifying in great detail the expert's background. The court concluded: "To put it bluntly, the federal
government pays him to analyze documents, the precise
task he was called upon to do in the district court." ld. at
1160.
In Paul the Eleventh Circuit also ruled that the trial court
had not abused its discretion in barring Professor
Denbeaux, one of the authors of the Pennsylvania Law
Review article, as a defense witness. In the court's view,
"[h]is skill, experience, training and education as a lawyer
did not make him any more qualified to testify as an expert
on handwriting analysis than a lay person who read the
same articles." In contrast, the Third Circuit reached the opposite conclusion in United States v. Velasquez, 64 F.3d
844, 846 (3d Cir. 1995)(finding that the trial judge "erred as
a matter of law in denying the defense the opportunity to
criticize the standards employed in that field of expertise."
Denbeaux would have testified that "handwriting analysis is
not a valid field of scientific expertise because it lacks standards to guide experts in weighing the match or non-match
of particular handwriting characteristics.").
In another post-Kumho case, United States v. Hines, 55
F.Supp.2d 62 (D. Mass. 1999), the court asserted that
Kumho"plainly invit[es] a reexamination even of 'generally
accepted' venerable, technical fields." As a result, expert
testimony concerning the general similarities and differences between a defendant's handwriting exemplar and a
stick up note was admissible but not the specific conclusion

that the defendant was the author, because such an opinion
lacked empirical validation.
Just as an article prompted the cases, in turn the cases
spawned several articles. Risinger and Saks released a
second article in 1996: Science and Nonscience in the
Courts: Daubert Meets Handwriting Identification Expertise,
82 Iowa L. Rev. 21 (1996). Professor Andre Moenssens
published a rebuttal article: Handwriting Identification
Evidence In the Post-Daubert World: Identifying the
Genuine Article and the Genuine Legal Issue: Broader
Standards Needed for "Scientific Knowledge," 66 U.M.K.C.
L. Rev. 251 (1997). Not surprisingly, Risinger, Denbeaux,
and Saks were not in full agreement with Moenssens's
analysis. Indeed, they promptly rejoined with a 1998 article,
disagreeing with his "bottom line" and critiquing his analysis.
Brave New "Post- Daubert World"-A Reply to Professor
Moenssens, 29 Seton Hall L. Rev. 405 (1998). This battle is
ongoing. See generally 2 Giannelli & lmwinkelried, Scientific
Evidence ch. 21 (3d ed. 1999).
POLYGRAPH EVIDENCE
The Fifth Circuit in United States v. Posada, 57 F.3d 428
(5th Cir. 1995), stated that "the rationale underlying this circuit's per se rule against admitting polygraph evidence did
not survive Daubert." ld. at 429. The court went on to comment that "[t]here can be no doubt that tremendous advances have been made in polygraph instrumentation and
technique in the years since Frye [1923] .... Current research indicates that, when given under controlled conditions, the polygraph technique accurately predicts truth or
deception between seventy and ninety percent of the time."
ld. at 434. The court, however, limited its ruling, commenting that "we do not now hold that polygraph examinations
are scientifically valid or that they will always assist the trier
of fact . . . . We merely remove the obstacle of the per se
· rule against admissibility, which was based on antiquated
concepts about the technical ability of the polygraph and
legal precepts that have been expressly overruled by the
Supreme Court." ld. See also United States v. Pettigrew, 77
F.3d 1500, 1515 (5th Cir. 1996) (trial court did not abuse its
discretion in excluding polygraph evidence).
The Ninth Circuit adopted the same position. See United
States v. Cordoba, 104 F.3d 225, 227-28 (9th Cir. 1997)
(noting that its former per se rule of exclusion is inconsistent
with Daubert). Two other circuits had embraced this position prior to Daubert, the Seventh Circuit had long abandoned the per se rule. See United States v. Pulido, 69 F.3d
192, 205 (7th Cir. 1995) ("Our decisions acknowledge the
considerable scientific and legal debate over polygraph testing and recognize that a trial court deciding whether to
admit polygraph evidence 'must engage in a delicate balancing of many factors including probative value, prejudicial
effect, confusion of the issues, misleading the jury, and
undue delay.") (quoting United States v. Olson, 978 F.2d
1472, 1480 (7th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 997
(1993)). In 1989 the Eleventh Circuit followed suit. United
States v. Piccinonna, 885 F.2d 1529 (11th Cir. 1989).
Admissibility Decisions
These decisions lead some commentators to believe that
Daubert had changed the legal landscape. The "trend appears to be moving toward admissibility." Zehnle, Polygraph
Admissibility in the Post-Daubert Era, ABA Criminal Justice
11, 13 (Summer 1997). In this altered climate, some district
courts admitted polygraph evidence. See United States v.
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Padilla, 908 F. Supp. 923 (S.D. Fla. 1995) (admitting polygraph evidence offered by the defense); State Farm Fire &
Cas. Co., 897 F. Supp. 299 (W.O. La. 1995) (admitting polygraph evidence in a civil case).
Two cases are of particular note. In United States v.
Crumby, 895 F. Supp. 1354 (D.C. Ariz. 1995), the court
ruled the evidence admissible:
A polygrapher is an expert in determining credibility.
If a party can lay the proper foundation to qualify such a
witness, then the requirements of Rule 608(a) will be
met. The polygrapher will not testify that he knows of the
subject's reputation for honesty, but that as an expert in
determining credibility, with respect to this case, the subject has demonstrated a character for truthfulness ....
[Although] the polygraph evidence's primary purpose is
to show credibility, ... it also is evidence that shows
Defendant was willing to take a polygraph and, in fact,
passed the examination. ld. at 1363.
United States v. Galbreth, 908 F. Supp. 877 (D.N.M.
1995), is another illustration. The court noted: "It is not entirely clear whether Daubert requires as a prerequisite to admissibility that the proponent establish the validity of the
specific application of a scientific technique." ld. at 880-81.
"[A]fter reviewing the case law addressing this issue in the
context of other forensic laboratory techniques and after
careful consideration of the testimony presented at the
hearing regarding the polygraph technique, the Court holds
that in the context of polygraph evidence, such scrutiny is
imperative to a faithful application of Daubert." The court
went on to rule "that in addition to establishing the scientific
validity of the polygraph technique in the abstract, the proponent of the proposed testimony must also prove that the
specific examination was conducted properly by a competent examiner." ld. at 895. "In conclusion, having determined that Dr. Raskin's testimony is based on 'scientific
knowledge' that 'will assist the trier of fact' the Court finds
that such testimony is sufficiently reliable and relevant to be
admissible under Fed. R. Evid. 702."
Opposing Views
Other federal circuit courts took a more cautious approach. See Conti v. Commissioner, 39 F.3d 658, 663 (6th
Cir. 1994) (noting that "unilaterally obtained polygraph evidence is almost never admissible under Evidence Rule
403"), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1082 (1995); United States v.
Sherlin, 67 F.3d 1208, 1216-17 (6th Cir. 1995) ("A privately
commissioned polygraph test, which was unknown to the
government until after its completion, is of extremely dubious probative value."); United States v. Williams, 95 F.3d
723, 729 (8th Cir. 1996) (defendant failed to lay a foundation for polygraph admissibility).
Indeed, the Second Circuit wrote that "the 'legal
Pandora's box' which the Fifth Circuit opened in United
States v. Posado ... is not yet agape in this Circuit." United
States v. Kwong, 69 F.3d 663, 668-69 (2d Cir. 1995) ('The
record before us simply does not provide the proper opportunity to explore the validity of polygraph evidence under
Rule 702."). See also United States v. Pitner, 969 F. Supp.
1246 (W.O. Wash. 1997); United States v. Castillo, 1997 WL
83746 (E.D. Pa. 1997) (polygraph evidence not admissible
under Evid. R. 608); Meyers v. Arcudi, 947 F. Supp. 581,
587 (D. Conn. 1996) ("[W]hile the accuracy of the COT polygraph exam has been tested, there are serious flaws which
may underestimate the error rates .... "); Miller v. Heaven,
922 F. Supp. 495, 503 (D. Kan. 1996) (insufficient showing

under Daubert and excludable under Rule 403); United
States v. Dominguez, 902 F. Supp. 757, 740 (E.D. Mich.
1995) (excluding evidence); United States v. Lech, 895 F.
Supp. 582,585 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) ("[T]he polygraph results
here are properly excluded under Rule 403."); United States
v. Black, 831 F. Supp. 120, 123 (E.D.N.Y. 1993) ("After evaluating the standard set forth in the Daubert case, premised
on Rule 702 ... , the Court believes that nothing in Daubert
would disturb the settled precedent that polygraph evidence
is neither reliable nor admissible.").
Recently, in United States v. Cordoba, 194 F. 3d 1053
(9th Cir. 1999), the Ninth Circuit considered Cordoba's appeal from the district court's decision after remand. See
United States v. Cordoba, 104 F.3d 225, 227-28 (9th Cir.
1997). Instead of excluding polygraph evidence based on
the per se rule of exclusion, the district court (after a twoday hearing) excluded the evidence under the Daubert
analysis. The appellate court upheld this decision.
State Cases
In addition, the state cases have not been influenced by
this development; several have reaffirmed the rule of categorical inadmissibility. E.g., People v. Gard, 632 N.E.2d
1026, 1032 (Ill. 1994) ("[T]he use of polygraph evidence ...
is no less repugnant to and no Jess an affront to the integrity
of the judicial process when the examination has been
given to a witness ... than it is when the examination has
been given to the defendant himself.").
Even while citing Daubert, courts have rejected polygraph evidence. E.g., State v. Porter, 694 A.2d 1262 (Conn.
1997) (adopting Daubert and excluding polygraph results
under Rule 403); State v. Beard, 461 S.E.2d 486, 493 (W.
Va. 1995) ("[W]e remain convinced that the reliability of
such examinations is still suspect and not generally accepted within the relevant scientific community. Therefore, any
speculation that our position in Frazier regarding polygraph
· admissibility is in question due to the Daubert/Wilt rulings is
put to rest today."). Other courts have continued to require
stipulations. E.g., State v. Webber, 918 P.2d 609, 619-20
(Kan. 1996) (citing "the ironclad rule that the results of such
examinations are inadmissible absent a stipulation between
the parties"); State v. Cosby, 927 P.2d 638, 642 (Utah 1996)
(reaffirming the need for a stipulation).
Constitutional Issues
In United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S.303, 118 S.Ct. 1261
(1998), the U.S. Supreme Court held that the per se rule of
exclusion was not unconstitutional. The Court acknowledged once more the right to present a defense, albeit a
qualified right. "A defendant's right to present relevant evidence is not unlimited, but rather is subject to reasonable
restrictions." 118 S.Ct. at 1264. In the Court's view, evidence "rules do not abridge an accused's right to present a
defense so long as they are not 'arbitrary' or disproportionate to the purposes they are designed to serve. Moreover,
we have found the exclusion of evidence to be unconstitutionally arbitrary or disproportionate only where it has infringed upon a weighty interest of the accused." ld.
Justice Thomas's majority opinion identified three interests
that support the per se rule of exclusion: (1) ensuring that
only reliable evidence is introduced at trial, (2) preserving
the jury's role in determining credibility, and (3) avoiding litigation of collateral issues. As to reliability, the opinion noted
that "the scientific community remains extremely polarized
about the reliability of polygraph techniques." ld. at 1265.
The opinion also observed that "[n]othing in Daubert fore-
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closed, as a constitutional matter, per se exclusionary rules
for certain types of expert or scientific evidence." ld. at 1266
n. 7. Justice Thomas also cited the jury's role in determining credibility: "By its very nature, polygraph evidence may
diminish the jury's role in making credibility determinations."
ld. at 1267. A third reason, in Justice Thomas's view, is the
avoidance of litigation on collateral issues, which "prolongs
criminal trials and threatens to distract the jury from its central function of determining guilt or innocence." .I d.
Justice Kennedy along with three other Justices rejected
the second and third interest. In his concurring opinion,
Justice Kennedy pointed out that Federal Rule 704 abolishes the ultimate issue rule and thus the invading-theprovince-of-the-jury argument had been rejected under
most modern evidence codes. Significantly, he also wrote:
! doubt, though, that the rule of per se exclusion is wise,
and some later case might present a more compelling
case for introduction of the testimony than this one does.
Though the considerable discretion given to the trial court
in admitting and excluding scientific evidence is not a
constitutional mandate, see Daubert ... there is some
tension between that rule and our holding today. And, as
Justice Stevens points out [in dissent], there is much inconsistency between the Government's extensive use of
polygraph to make vital security determinations and the
argument it makes here, stressing the inaccuracy of
these tests. ld. at 1269.
Indeed, the extensive use of the polygraph by the government is well documented. For example, in 1996, the
Department of Defense (DoD) conducted 12,548 polygraph
examinations. Sixty-three percent (7,945) involved the DoD
Counterintelligence-Scope Polygraph (CSP) Program. The
other categories include 21.5% criminal investigations
(2,696), 4.6% exculpatory (579), and 10.6% miscellaneous
(1 ,328). The latter includes security investigations, counterintelligence and intelligence operations, and assistance to
non-DoD federal agencies. Department of Defense,
Polygraph Program, Annual Report to Congress 1 (1996).
Further, the Department of Defense Polygraph Institute
(DoDPI) trains 100 federal examiners a year in a masters
level program, as well as allocates funds for polygraph research. The DoDPI trains all federal polygraph examiners.
See also Ronald M. Furgerson, Perspectives on
Polygraphs: A Guide to Survival, 21 Polygraph 164, 164
(1992) (from 1977 to 1992, 115 FBI agents have attended
the DoD Polygraph Institute (or its predecessor); they have
conducted over 40,000 polygraph exams).
Moreover, the polygraph is frequently used in criminal
cases. For example, many jurisdictions admit polygraph evidence upon stipulation, even though the stipulation does
nothing to enhance the reliability of the evidence, which is
the principal reason for exclusion. Similarly, courts have admitted polygraph evidence in suppression hearings, sentencing hearings, motions for new trial proceedings, and
prison disciplinary hearings. In addition, some courts have
enforced plea bargains based on polygraph evidence. In
some cases prosecutors have gone beyond stipulating to
the admissibility of test results and have agreed to dismiss
charges if the defendant passes a polygraph examination.
See also United States v. Santiago-Gonzales, 66 F.3d 3, 6
n. 1 (1st Cir. 1995) (polygraph used to measure defendant's
requirement to be truthful under a plea agreement). See
generally Giannelli, Polygraph Evidence: Post-Daubert, 49
Hastings L.J. 895 (1998).

SOCIAL SCIENCE EVIDENCE
Another category of cases vulnerable to re-examination
under Kumho concerns so-called "syndrome" evidencee.g., battered woman syndrome (BWS), rape traum_a syndrome (RTS), and child sexual abuse accommodation syndrome (CSAAS).
Rape Trauma Syndrome
The initial research on rape trauma syndrome was developed to aid rape victims: "[R]ape trauma syndrome ~as not
devised to determine the 'truth' or 'accuracy' of a particular
past event-i.e., whether, in fact, a rape in the legal sense
occurred-but rather was developed by professional rape
counselors as a therapeutic tool, to help identify, predict and
treat emotional problems experienced by the counselor's
clients or patients." People v. Bledsoe, 681 P.2d 291, 300
(Cal. 1984). In therapy, what the patient thinks happened is
often more important than what actually happened.
This research may still, however, be useful at trial for nonsubstantive purposes. RTS evidence may be helpful on a
credibility theory if the defendant suggests to the jury that
the victim's conduct after the incident, such as a delay in reporting the assault, is inconsistent with the claim of rape. In
this situation, "expert testimony on rape trauma syndrome
may play a particularly useful role by disabusing the jury of
some widely held misconceptions about rape and rape victims, so that it may evaluate the evidence free of ... popular
myths." ld. at 298. Most courts accept this view, admitting
expert testimony to account for a victim's (1) passive resistance during a rape, (2) delay in reporting the crime, (3) failure to attempt to escape, and (4) calm demeanor after an
attack. RTS evidence has also been introduced to explain
that "in the context of a trust relationship, such as a doctorpatient relationship, some victims may return to the trusted
relationship for further contact with the perpetrator of the assault." Commonwealth v. Mamay, 553 N.E.2d 945, 951
(Mass. 1990).
Repressed Memories
Similarly, repressed memories and hypnotically enhanced testimony are subject to challenge. In Borawick v.
Shay, 68 F.3d 597 (2d Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 517 U.S.
1219 (1996), a civil case, the plaintiff had no memory of
child abuse for 20 years. Then after hypno-therapy, she
claimed to recall that her aunt and uncle had sexually
abused her when she was age 4 and 7. The Second
Circuit, in a case of first impression, ruled the repressed
memory evidence inadmissible. The court conceded: "We
do not believe that Daubert is directly applicable to the issue
here since Daubert concerns the admissibility of data derived from scientific techniques or expert opinions." ld. at
610. Nevertheless, "[e]ven though Daubert does not provide direct guidance, our decision today is informed by the
principles underlying the Supreme Court's holding." ld.
False Confessions
Re-evaluation under Kumho does not, however, necessarily mean exclusion; social science research may offer
valuable insights-if based on methodologically sound studies. Hence, in United States v. Hall, 93 F.3d 1337 (7th Cir.
1996), the Seventh Circuit ruled that the trial court erred
when it excluded expert testimony on false confessions:
[The trial court] ruling overlooked the utility of valid social
science. Even though the jury may have had beliefs
about the subject, the question is whether those beliefs
were correct. Properly conducted social science research often shows that commonly held beliefs are in
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!3rror. Dr. Ofshe's testimony, assuming its scientific validity, would have let the jury know that a phenomenon
known as false confessions exists, how to recognize it,
and how to decide whether it fits the facts of the case
being tried. ld. at 1345.
Similarly, in United States v. Shay, 57 F.3d 126 (1st Cir.
1995), the First Circuit reversed the trial court's exclusion of
psychiatric testimony that the defendant's inculpatory statements were caused by pseudologia fantastica, a mental disorder rendering the person a pathological liar who makes
false statements without regard to their consequences.
The Tennessee Supreme Court in State v. Shuck, 953
S.W.2d 662 (Tenn. 1997), reached a similar result. The
Shuck court ruled admissible a neuropsychologist's testimony concerning a defendant's acute susceptibility to inducement in support of an ertrapment defense.

CONCLUSION
In Kumho Tire the Supreme Court once again affirmed its
determination to improve the quality of expert testimony in
federal trials: "The objective of [Oauberfs gatekeeping] requirement is to ensure the reliability and relevancy of expert
testimony. It is to make certain that an expert, whether basing testimony upon professional studies or personal experience, employs in the courtroom the same level of intellectual rigor that characterizes the practice of an expert in the
relevant field." 119 S.Ct. at 1176. As forceful as these
words are, the Court's actions may speak even louder:
When the dust settled at the end of each case in its expert
testimony trilogy-Daubert, Joinder, and Kumho, the Court
had upheld the exclusion of the proffered expert testimony.
It is true that in Daubert, the Court remanded. However, on
remand, the court of appeals again excluded the evidence,
and the Supreme Court denied certiorari. 43 F.3d 1311 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 869 (1995).
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